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We axiomatically develop a class of power indices for effectivity functions, both for the 
case where the set of alternatives is ﬁnite and where it is inﬁnite. Such power indices make 
it possible to take the issues under consideration into account, in contrast to power indices 
deﬁned just for simple games. As an example, we consider the US legislative system. We 
also show that our approach can be used to develop power indices for spatial political 
games.
© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
A power index is a tool to measure and compare the power of players in political and economic situations. In a demo-
cratic Parliament the number of seats of a political party is a poor indication of its power. Rather, a measure of power should 
be based on the likelihood that such a party is decisive. One way to assess this is to model Parliament as a simple game, 
by establishing which coalitions of political parties are winning and which are losing – based on the required majorities to 
pass bills or amendments. To such a simple game one may then apply a power index, for instance the Banzhaf–Coleman 
index and the Shapley–Shubik index (see for instance Bertini et al., 2013, for a recent overview).
Similarly, economic situations as for instance ﬁnancial and corporate governance structures may be modelled by simple 
games, and power indices may be applied in order to obtain some indication of the real inﬂuence of ﬁrms or investment 
companies in such situations (Crama and Leruth, 2007, 2013; Karos and Peters, 2015).
These indices are ex ante power measures: their main application lies in the design of voting mechanisms that have a 
desired distribution of power among its members (see for instance Felsenthal and Machover, 2005; Laruelle and Valenciano, 
2008, for details). This approach to power measurement clearly has its limitations: In political situations, neither the position 
of a political party nor the issues at stake are taken into consideration. For this reason, in political science spatial models 
are considered, which enable to represent both a party’s position and the issues involved.
In the present paper we generalize the simple game approach and also the spatial game approach by considering the very 
broad model of an effectivity function (Moulin and Peleg, 1982) and developing a theory of power indices for such functions. 
Given a number of players and a set of alternatives, an effectivity function assigns to each coalition (subset of players) a 
collection of sets of alternatives. If a coalition S is effective for a set B of alternatives, then this is generally interpreted as 
the coalition S being able to guarantee that the ﬁnal alternative is in B . Alternatives could be social states, and a coalition 
may be constitutionally entitled to the ﬁnal social state being in a certain set of social states. Or alternatives could be laws, 
and a coalition of parties may have the power (e.g., because it has a certain majority) to pass certain laws. In ﬁnancial or 
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many shares. More formally, effectivity functions may be derived from social choice functions or correspondences, or from 
game forms.
The following is a speciﬁc political example, which will recur at several places in this paper.
Example 1.1 (The US legislative process). In US legislation any bill must be passed by the two chambers of Congress, the Senate 
(100 members) and the House (of Representatives, 435 members), and signed by the President before it comes to law. If 
the President vetoes the bill, Congress can override this decision by a two third majority. In case of an Executive Order by 
the President, no approval by Congress is needed.
The President can agree on international treaties, but these must be approved by a two third majority of the Senate. 
In case of Congressional-executive Agreements (agreements that affect domestic policies, such as free trade agreements) 
a simple majority approval both in the Senate and in the House are necessary; and Executive Agreements need no approval 
by Congress at all.
Before and after the 2016 election the Republicans have (had) a majority in both chambers of Congress, but they do not 
have a two third majority. If we consider the Republicans (R) and the Democrats (D) as one player each, we see that until 
the new President is sworn in, the singleton set {D} is effective for any outcome that can be reached via Executive Orders 
or Agreements, while {R} is not effective for anything. After that {R} will be effective for outcomes that can be reached via 
normal bills, Congressional-executive agreements, and Executive Orders and Agreements.
Alternatively, we can analyze the situation from the individuals’ points view. In this case the singleton {p} which contains 
only the president, is effective for any outcome that can be reached via Executive Orders or Agreements; a coalition S is 
effective for an outcome {a} that can be reached via a domestic law or a Congressional-executive Agreement if S contains p
and more than half of the members of the Senate and of the House. In the ﬁrst case it is also suﬃcient if S contains more 
than two thirds of the members of the Senate and of the House. In particular, a coalition T is effective for the set A \ {a} – 
in other words, T can veto a – if p ∈ T and, in case of a domestic law, T contains more than one third of the members of 
either the Senate or the House. If a is an international treaty then S is effective for {a} if p ∈ S and S contains two thirds 
of the members of the Senate. 
Effectivity functions and the concept of a power index for effectivity functions are introduced in Section 2. Our basic 
axioms for power indices are introduced in Section 3: the Transfer Property, Anonymity, and Monotonicity. The Transfer 
Property is a generalized additivity condition which enables us to unravel an effectivity function in terms of elementary 
effectivity functions which are much easier to analyze. Anonymity and Monotonicity are natural conditions in this context. 
In Section 4 we consider the case where the set of alternatives is ﬁnite and characterize all power indices satisfying the 
Transfer Property, Anonymity, and Monotonicity. Such a power index works as follows. For each set of alternatives, consider 
the simple game in which exactly those coalitions that are effective for that set of alternatives are winning. Also, to each set 
of alternatives attach a non-negative number such that these numbers sum up to one. Then the power index is obtained by 
taking the sum of the Shapley values of these simple games weighted by the chosen numbers. This leaves much freedom, 
namely in choosing these weights. In the remainder of Section 4 we (1) show that all these power indices reduce to the 
Shapley value for an effectivity function associated with a simple game (winning coalitions are effective for every set of 
alternatives, losing coalitions only for the whole set); (2) establish connections between power indices for the duals of 
simple games and polar effectivity functions (which describe what coalitions can obtain in reaction to outside players); 
(3) show that a power index is neutral if and only if the weights only depend on the cardinalities of the sets of alternatives; 
(4) show that requiring a stronger version of Monotonicity results in non-singleton nontrivial sets of alternatives having 
weight zero; and (5) consider the role of null-players. In Section 5 we extend our main characterization to effectivity 
functions for an inﬁnite set of alternatives, under Strong Monotonicity instead of Monotonicity and, additionally a Null 
Player axiom and a continuity condition. Basically, we obtain a similar characterization, now with the weights of the ﬁnite 
case replaced by a probability measure over the set of alternatives. In a separate subsection, we show how this approach 
can lead to developing power indices for spatial political models, similar in spirit to the Owen–Shapley spatial power index.
In an Appendix we show that the axioms in our main characterization are logically independent.
2. Preliminaries
We start with some notations. For a set D we denote by P (D) the set of all subsets of D , and by P0(D) the set of all 
nonempty subsets of D . By |D| we denote the number of elements of D .
Throughout, N = {1, . . . , n} (n ∈ N) is the set of players. Subsets of N are also called coalitions. We denote by A the set 
of alternatives. We ﬁx a set T ⊆ P0(A). In the ﬁrst part of the paper, A is ﬁnite and T = P0(A); later, A can be inﬁnite, 
endowed with a topology, and then T will be the collection of nonempty closed subsets of A.
Deﬁnition 2.1. An effectivity function (for T ) is a map E : P (N) → P (T ) such that (i) P (∅) = ∅, (ii) A ∈ E(S) for every 
S ∈ P0(N), and (iii) E(N) = T . An effectivity function E is monotonic if B ∈ E(S) implies B ′ ∈ E(T ) for all B, B ′ ∈ T and 
S, T ∈ P0(N) such that B ⊆ B ′ and S ⊆ T . An effectivity function E is superadditive if B ∩ B ′ ∈ E(S ∪ T ) for all B, B ′ ∈ T
and S, T ∈ P0(N) such that B ∈ E(S), B ′ ∈ E(T ), and S ∩ T = ∅. By E we denote the set of all monotonic and superadditive 
effectivity functions.
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(E ∪ F )(S) = E(S) ∪ F (S)
(E ∩ F )(S) = E(S) ∩ F (S)
for all S ∈ P (N). The following result is well-known, and we omit its easy proof.
Lemma 2.2. Let E, F ∈ E . Then E ∩ F ∈ E .
Note that E, F ∈ E does not imply E ∪ F ∈ E since E ∪ F is monotonic but not necessarily superadditive.
The aim of this paper is to develop a class of power indices for effectivity functions (rather than for simple games).
Deﬁnition 2.3. A power index is a map ϕ : E →RN with ∑i∈N ϕi(E) = 1.
With effectivity functions, simple games can be associated. A simple game is a function v : 2N → {0, 1} satisfying v(∅) = 0, 
v(N) = 1, and v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all S, T ∈ P (N) with S ⊆ T – the last property is called monotonicity. Coalitions S with 
v(S) = 1 are winning, the other coalitions are losing. The Shapley value Sh, also called Shapley–Shubik power index (Shapley, 
1953a, 1953b; Shapley and Shubik, 1954), assigns to player i in a simple game v the number
Shi(v) =
∑
S∈P (N): i /∈S
|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n! [v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)] .
For an effectivity function E ∈ E , a set of alternatives B ∈ T , and a coalition S ∈ P (N) let
vEB(S) =
{
1 if B ∈ E(S)
0 otherwise.
(1)
Clearly, vEB is a simple game for each B ∈ T . In this game, a coalition is winning exactly if it is effective for B .
Example 2.4. Recall the US Legislation example from the beginning. Let N = {p} ∪ S ∪H where p is the president, S contains 
the 100 members of Senate, and H contains the 435 members of the House. Let A1 be the set of outcomes that can be 
achieved by international treaties, A2 those that can be achieved by Congressional-executive Agreements, A3 those that can 
be achieved by Executive Agreements or Orders, and A4 those that can be achieved by domestic laws. Then Legislation can 
be represented by the minimal effectivity function E with
{a} ∈ E(T ) for all a ∈ A3 if p ∈ T ,
{a} ∈ E(T ) for all a ∈ A4 if |T ∩ S| ≥ 67 and |T ∩ H| ≥ 290,
{a} ∈ E(T ) for all a ∈ A1 ∪ A3 if p ∈ T and |T ∩ S| ≥ 67,
{a} ∈ E(T ) for all a ∈ A2 ∪ A3 ∪ A4 if p ∈ T and |T ∩ S| ≥ 51
and |T ∩ H| ≥ 218,
{a} ∈ E(T ) for all a ∈ A if p ∈ T and |T ∩ S| ≥ 67
and |T ∩ H| ≥ 218,
A \ {a} ∈ E(T ) for all a ∈ A1 if |T ∩ S| ≥ 34,
A \ {a} ∈ E(T ) for all a ∈ A2 ∪ A4 if |T ∩ S| ≥ 50 or |T ∩ H| ≥ 218,
A \ {a} ∈ E(T ) for all a ∈ A if p ∈ T and (|T ∩ S| ≥ 34
or T ∩ H ≥ 146) .
Note that this effectivity function is somewhat simpliﬁed as it ignores the majority leaders’ ability to schedule the consid-
eration of a bill. The combination of a Filibuster by a Senator (which can be broken by a majority of 60 Senators) together 
with a Pocket Veto by the President is covered by the last line above. 
3. Main axioms for power indices
The main condition that we will put on a power index ϕ is the following, which was ﬁrst formulated for a value on 
simple games by (Dubey, 1975).
Transfer property. For all E, F ∈ E such that E ∪ F ∈ E ,
ϕ (E ∪ F ) + ϕ (E ∩ F ) = ϕ(E) + ϕ(F ).
Throughout, we will also impose anonymity. For a permutation π of N and an effectivity function E ∈ E , let π E ∈ E be 
deﬁned by (π E)(π(S)) = E(S) for all S ∈ P (N).
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Next, we introduce two monotonicity conditions.
Monotonicity. ϕi(E) ≤ ϕi(F ) for all E, F ∈ E and every i ∈ N such that E(S) \ E(S \ {i}) ⊆ F (S) \ F (S \ {i}) for all S ∈ P (N).
Strong monotonicity. ϕi(E) ≤ ϕi(F ) for all E, F ∈ E and every i ∈ N such that {a} ∈ E(S) \ E(S \ {i}) implies {a} ∈ F (S) \
F (S \ {i}) for all S ∈ P (N) and all a ∈ A.
Monotonicity states that if in one effectivity function a player contributes more than in another one, then in the former that 
player should be attributed more power than in the latter. Strong monotonicity weakens the premise of monotonicity by 
requiring a player only to contribute more as far as single alternatives are concerned, and thus results in a stronger axiom. 
An effectivity function may, for instance, represent the ability of coalitions to keep the social state within a certain range. 
However, when measuring power it might be more relevant to ask which (single) social states a coalition can achieve, than 
to which social states a coalition can reduce the outcome. For instance, a party’s power in a parliament may be reﬂected by 
its ability to pass speciﬁc bills. In the effectivity function in Example 2.4 this would mean that the last three cases do not 
add to the power of any Congressmen. This idea is reﬂected by strong monotonicity instead of just monotonicity.
Call a player i ∈ N a null player in E ∈ E if E(S) \ E(S \ {i}) = ∅ for all S ∈ P (N). Note that in particular E(N \ {i}) = T if 
i is a null player in E . The ﬁnal condition we introduce in this section is as follows.
Null player. ϕi(E) = 0 for every E ∈ E and every null player i in E .
4. Finitely many alternatives
Throughout this section we assume that A is ﬁnite and that T = P0(A). Our main result is the characterization of the set 
of all power indices satisfying the Transfer Property, Anonymity, and Monotonicity. We start with some preliminary results.
For B ∈ P (A) we denote B+ = {B ′ ∈ P0(A) : B ⊆ B ′}. For an effectivity function E ∈ E and a set B ∈ P0(A) we deﬁne
EB(S) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
P0(A) if S = N
B+ if B ∈ E(S)
{A} if B /∈ E(S) and S = ∅
∅ if S = ∅.
(2)
Clearly, EB ∈ E for each B ∈ P0(A). We also have the following result about unions of effectivity functions EB .
Lemma 4.1. Let E ∈ E and let ∅ = K ⊆ P0(A) such that B ∩ B ′ ∈ K for all B, B ′ ∈ K . Then F =⋃B∈K EB ∈ E .
Proof. Clearly, F is monotonic. For superadditivity, let S, T ∈ P0(N) with S ∩ T = ∅, X ∈ F (S), Y ∈ F (T ). Then there are 
B, B ′ ∈ K such that B ⊆ X , B ′ ⊆ Y , B ∈ E(S), and B ′ ∈ E(T ). By superadditivity of E we have B ∩ B ′ ∈ E(S∪ T ), and B ∩ B ′ ∈ K
since K is closed under intersection. Hence, X ∩ Y ∈ F (S ∪ T ). 
An elementary effectivity function is an effectivity function of the form
U BT (S) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
P0(A) if S = N
B+ if S ⊇ T , S = ∅, and S = N
{A} if S  T and S = ∅
∅ if S = ∅
for some B ∈ P (A) and T ∈ P (N). Clearly, U BT ∈ E for all B ∈ P (A) and T ∈ P (N). We now show that under the Transfer 
Property a power index ϕ is completely determined by its values on elementary effectivity functions.
Lemma 4.2. Let ϕ and ψ be power indices satisfying the Transfer Property and let ϕ
(
U BS
)= ψ (U BS ) for all B ∈ P (A) and all S ∈ P (N). 
Then ϕ = ψ .
Proof. Note that any E ∈ E can be written as E = ∪B∈P0(A)EB . Hence, to prove that ϕ = ψ , it is suﬃcient to prove that 
ϕ(∪B∈K EB) = ψ(∪B∈K EB) for every ∅ = K ⊆ P0(A) which is closed under intersection. We prove this by induction on 
k = |K |. First let k = 1, say K = {B}, and write E = EB = ∪ j∈I U BS j , where I ⊆ N with |I| ≤ 2n and {S j ∈ P0(N) : j ∈ I} is the 
set of those coalitions S j that are minimally effective for B , i.e., B ∈ E(S j) but B /∈ E(T ) for all T  S j . Then
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∑
∅= J⊆I
(−1)| J |+1ϕ
⎛⎝⋂
j∈ J
U BS j
⎞⎠= ∑
∅= J⊆I
(−1)| J |+1ϕ
(
U B⋃
j∈ J S j
)
=
∑
∅= J⊆I
(−1)| J |+1ψ
(
U B⋃
j∈ J S j
)
=
∑
∅= J⊆I
(−1)| J |+1ψ
⎛⎝⋂
j∈ J
U BS j
⎞⎠
= ψ(E)
where the ﬁrst and ﬁfth equalities follow from Lemma A.1 in the Appendix. Now let kˆ ≥ 2 and suppose that ϕ (⋃B∈K EB)=
ψ
(⋃
B∈K EB
)
for every K with |K | = k < kˆ. Take K̂ with ∣∣K̂ ∣∣ = kˆ and let B̂ ∈ K̂ be a set of maximal cardinality. Let F =⋃
B∈K̂ E B . Then by the Transfer Property and Lemmas 2.2 and 4.1 we have
ϕ(F ) = ϕ
⎛⎝ ⋃
B∈K̂\{B̂}
EB
⎞⎠+ ϕ (E B̂)− ϕ
⎛⎝⎛⎝ ⋃
B∈K̂\{B̂}
EB
⎞⎠∩ E B̂
⎞⎠
= ϕ
⎛⎝ ⋃
B∈K̂\{B̂}
EB
⎞⎠+ ϕ (E B̂)− ϕ
⎛⎝ ⋃
B∈K̂\{B̂}
EB∪B̂
⎞⎠ .
Thus, by the induction hypothesis,
ϕ(F ) = ψ
⎛⎝ ⋃
B∈K̂\{B̂}
EB
⎞⎠+ ψ (E B̂)− ψ
⎛⎝ ⋃
B∈K̂\{B̂}
EB∪B̂
⎞⎠= ψ(F ),
completing the proof. 
The following lemmas state some consequences of Anonymity and Monotonicity for the power index ϕ .
Lemma 4.3. Let ϕ satisfy Monotonicity. Then ϕ j
(
U BS
)= ϕ j (U BT ) for all B ∈ P (A), all S, T ∈ P (N) and all j ∈ N \ (S ∪ T ).
Proof. Let R ⊆ N and j ∈ R , j ∈ N \ (S ∪ T ). Then
U BS (R) \ U BS (R \ { j}) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
{A} if R = { j}
∅ if R = { j} and R = N
P0(A) \ B+ if R = N
= U BT (R) \ U BT (R \ { j}).
Hence ϕ j
(
U BS
)= ϕ j (U BT ) by monotonicity. 
The proof of the following lemma is obvious and therefore omitted.
Lemma 4.4. Let ϕ satisfy Anonymity. Then ϕi
(
U BS
)= ϕ j (U BT ) for all B ∈ P (A), all S, T ∈ P (N) with |S| = |T | and all i ∈ S and j ∈ T .
A weight system is a collection ω = (ωB)B∈P0(A) of real numbers such that ∑B∈P0(A) ωB = 1. Call a weight system ω
non-negative if ωB ≥ 0 for all B ⊆ A. For a weight system ω we deﬁne the power index ω by
ω(E) =
∑
B∈P0(A)
ωB Sh
(
vEB
)
for every E ∈ E . The main result of this section is as follows.
Theorem 4.5. A power index ϕ satisﬁes the Transfer Property, Anonymity, and Monotonicity if and only if there is a non-negative 
weight system ω such that ϕ = ω . Moreover, for any weight systems ω and ω′ , ω = ω′ implies ω = ω′ .
Proof. We leave it to the reader to verify that ω satisﬁes the Transfer Property, Anonymity, and Monotonicity for any 
non-negative weight system ω. Now let ϕ be a power index with these three properties. By Lemma 4.2 it is suﬃcient to 
prove that there is a weight system ω as in the theorem such that ϕ
(
U B
)= ω (U B) for every S ∈ P (N) and B ∈ P (A).S S
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(
U BS
) = ωi (U BS ) = 1n for each B ∈ P (A) and i ∈ N by Anonymity of ϕ and 
ω . For S ∈ P (N) \ {N}, j ∈ N \ S , and B ∈ P (A) we have for E = U BS :
ωj
(
U BS
)
=
∑
B ′∈P0(A)
ωB
′
Sh j
(
vEB ′
)
=
∑
B ′∈P0(A),B ′ /∈B+
ωB
′
Sh j
(
vEB ′
)
+
∑
B ′∈P0(A),B ′∈B+
ωB
′
Sh j
(
vEB ′
)
=
∑
B ′∈P0(A),B ′ /∈B+
ωB
′
Sh j
(
vEB ′
)
+ Sh j
(
vEA
)
=
∑
B ′∈P0(A),B ′ /∈B+
ωB
′
n
+ ω
A
n
. (3)
(Here we have used that Shi
(
vEA
) = 1n for every i ∈ N , and that Sh j (vEB ′) = 0 if E = U BS , B ∈ P0(A) \ {A}, B ′ ∈ B+ , and 
j ∈ N \ S .) On the other hand, by Lemma 4.3, ϕ j
(
U BS
)
does not depend on S (as long as j /∈ S), and by Anonymity ϕ (U BS ) is 
completely determined by ϕ j
(
U BS
)
. We now ﬁrst show that the system of equations
ϕ j
(
U BS
)
=
∑
B ′∈P0(A),B ′ /∈B+
ωB
′
n
+ ω
A
n
, B ∈ P0(A) (4)
has a unique solution ω = (ωB)B∈P0(A) . To show this, it is suﬃcient to show that the (2|A| − 1)× (2|A| − 1) matrix M with 
rows and columns labelled by the sets in P0(A) and with elements mB,C deﬁned by
mB,C =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1 if B = A and C /∈ (B+ \ {A})
1 if B = A or C = A
0 in all other cases
has full rank. We may order the rows of M according to increasing size of B , that is, if |B ′| < |B| then row (mB,C )C∈P0(A) is 
below row 
(
mB ′,C
)
C∈P0(A) . In particular, the last row corresponds to A. We also let the last column correspond to A, hence 
it has the form 
(
mB,A
)
B∈P0(A) . We ﬁx the other columns by letting the diagonal elements, except the last one, be of the 
form mB,A\B (the last one is mA,A ). From these assumptions it follows, in particular, that B ∩ C = ∅ whenever mB,C is below 
the diagonal.
Next, we manipulate the rows of M by letting, for all B, C ∈ P0(A),
m˜B,C =mB,C +
∑
∅=B ′B
(−1)|B|−|B ′|mB ′,C .
This way we obtain the matrix M˜ , and it is suﬃcient to prove that M˜ has full rank. We consider three different types of 
elements mB,C of the original matrix M .
(a) Suppose mB,C = 0. Then B, C = A and B ⊆ C and hence mB ′,C = 0 for all ∅ = B ′  B , so that m˜B,C =mB,C = 0.
(b) Suppose mB,C = 1 and mB,C is below the diagonal of M . Then B ∩ (A \ C) = ∅ and B ∩ C = ∅. Now
m˜B,C =mB,C +
∑
∅=B ′B
(−1)|B|−|B ′|mB ′,C
=mB,C +
∑
∅=B ′B
(−1)|B|−|B ′| −
∑
∅=B ′B,B ′⊆C
(−1)|B|−|B ′|
=mB,C +
∑
B ′B
(−1)|B|−|B ′| −
∑
B ′B,B ′⊆C
(−1)|B|−|B ′|
= 1+ (−1) −
∑
B ′⊆B∩C
(−1)|B|−|B ′|
= 1+ (−1) + 0 .
In the fourth equality we have used the fact that B ∩ C = ∅. (Furthermore, we have used that ∑k=0(−1)k()= 0.)k
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m˜B,A\B =mB,A\B +
∑
∅=B ′B
(−1)|B|−|B ′|mB ′,A\B
= 1+
∑
∅=B ′B
(−1)|B|−|B ′|
= 1+ 0− (−1)|B| − (−1)0
= ±1 .
In particular, m˜B,A\B = 0 for every B ∈ P0(A) \ {A}. By exactly the same argument (replace A \ B by A) it follows that 
m˜A,A = 0.
From (a)–(c) we conclude that M˜ is an upper triangular matrix with non-zero diagonal elements and thus has full rank. 
Therefore, the system of equations (4) has a unique solution ω = (ωB)B∈P0(A) . We next show that the numbers ωB sum 
to 1, as follows. For every i ∈ N , by (3), ϕi(U A∅ ) =
∑
B∈P0(A)
ωB
n , and by summing over i ∈ N we obtain n 
∑
B∈P0(A)
ωB
n = 1.
Non-negativity of ω is implied by Monotonicity of ϕ as follows. Suppose, to the contrary, that ωB < 0 for some B ∈
P0(A). Let S ∈ P0(N) \ {N} and let i ∈ N \ S . Let E =⋃B ′B U B ′S and let F = U BS . Then E, F ∈ E , and for T ⊆ N with i ∈ T ,
E(T ) \ E(T \ {i}) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
{A} if T = {i}(
P0(A) \ B+
)∪ {B} if T = N
∅ otherwise
and
F (T ) \ F (T \ {i}) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
{A} if T = {i}
P0(A) \ B+ if T = N
∅ otherwise.
Therefore Monotonicity of ϕ implies ϕi(F ) ≤ ϕi(E). On the other hand, by (4),
ϕi(F ) =
∑
B ′∈P0(A): B ′ /∈B+
ωB
′
n
+ ω
A
n
and
ϕi(E) = ω(E)
=
∑
B ′∈P0(A)
ωB
′
Shi
(
vEB ′
)
=
∑
B ′∈P0(A): B ′ /∈B+
ωB
′
Shi
(
vEB ′
)
+
∑
B ′∈P0(A): B ′∈B+,B ′ =B
ωB
′
Shi
(
vEB ′
)
+ ωB Shi
(
vEB
)
=
∑
B ′∈P0(A): B ′ /∈B+
ωB
′
n
+ ω
A
n
+ ω
B
n
< ϕi(F )
which is a contradiction. Hence, ω is non-negative. The last claim in the theorem follows by unicity of ω as proved 
above. 
In the remainder of this section we consider further properties of power indices of the form ω .
4.1. Connection with simple games
With a simple game v we can associate an effectivity function Ev in a natural way by deﬁning
Ev(S) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
P0(A) if v(S) = 1
{A} if v(S) = 0 and S = ∅
∅ if S = ∅.
Then vE
v = v for every B ∈ P0(A). From this the following result is straightforward.B
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Thus, for effectivity functions associated with simple games, ω reduces to the Shapley value for every weight system ω.
4.2. Dual games and polar effectivity functions
For a simple game v , the dual game is the game v∗ deﬁned by v∗(S) = v(N) − v(N \ S) for all S ∈ P (N). Note that v∗ is 
again a simple game (in particular, it is monotonic).
For an effectivity function E ∈ E , the polar effectivity function is the effectivity function E∗ deﬁned by E∗(∅) = ∅ and 
E∗(S) = {B ∈ P0(A) : B ∩ B ′ = ∅ for all B ′ ∈ E(N \ S)}. Note that E∗ ∈ E .
The following results are easily established.
Theorem 4.7. Let E ∈ E . Then:
(a)
(
vEB
)∗ = vE∗A\B for all B ∈ P0(A) \ {A}.
(b)
(
vEA
)∗ = v F ∗B for all B ∈ P0(A) \ {A}, where F ∈ E is deﬁned by F (∅) = ∅ and F (S) = P0(A) for all S ∈ P0(N).
For a weight system ω deﬁne the weight system ω¯ by ω¯B = ωA\B for all B ∈ P0(A) \ {A} and ω¯A = ωA . Then we have 
the following consequence of Theorem 4.7.
Theorem 4.8. ω(E) = ω¯(E∗) for every E ∈ E and every weight system ω. In particular, ω(E) = ω(E∗) if ωB = ωA\B for all 
B ∈ P0(A) \ {A}.
If an effectivity function is interpreted as describing what coalitions can guarantee on their own, then the polar effectivity 
function describes what a coalition cannot be kept from by its complement. Theorem 4.8 says that the power of a player 
in an effectivity function is the same in its polar if we switch the weights of sets of alternatives with those of their 
complements, in line with these interpretations.
4.3. Neutrality
For a permutation π of A and E ∈ E , deﬁne Eπ ∈ E by Eπ (S) = {π(B) : B ∈ E(S)}.
Neutrality. ϕ(E) = ϕ(Eπ ) for every permutation π of A and every E ∈ E .
We omit the easy proof of the following result.
Theorem 4.9. A power index ϕ satisﬁes the Transfer Property, Anonymity, Monotonicity, and Neutrality if and only if there is a non-
negative weight system ω with ωB = ωB ′ for all B, B ′ ∈ P0(A) with |B| = |B ′|, such that ϕ = ω .
4.4. Strong monotonicity
The premise of Strong Monotonicity is much weaker than the one of Monotonicity: we are now comparing only a player’s 
(marginal) ability to enforce (single) outcomes. As may be expected intuitively, for a power index ω this condition results 
in the weights of non-singleton but strict subsets of alternatives becoming zero.
Theorem 4.10. Let A be a ﬁnite set. A power index ϕ satisﬁes the Transfer Property, Anonymity, and Strong Monotonicity if and only if 
there is a non-negative weight system ω with ωB = 0 for all B ∈ P (A) \ {A} with |B| ≥ 2, such that ϕ = ω .
Proof. Showing that a power index ω as in the statement of the theorem satisﬁes Strong Monotonicity (all the other 
axioms are satisﬁed by Theorem 4.5) is straightforward and omitted here. For the only-if direction, again by Theorem 4.5, 
for a power index ϕ satisfying the three conditions there is a weight system ω such that ϕ = ω . For B ∈ P (A) \ {A} with 
|B| ≥ 2, i ∈ N , S ∈ P0(N), and a ∈ A we have that {a} ∈ U BS (T ) \ U BS (T \ {i}) if and only if T = N . This is the case if and 
only if {a} ∈ U BN (T ) \ U BN (T \ {i}). Hence, by Strong Monotonicity, ωi
(
U BS
) = ωi (U BN) = 1n for all S ∈ P0(N), i ∈ N , and 
B ∈ P (A) \ {A} with |B| ≥ 2. By (4) it then follows that ωB = 0 for all such B . 
The next example provides an application of a strongly monotonic power index to US legislation.
Example 4.11 (Example 2.4 continued). Recall that the Republicans have absolute majorities both in the Senate and in the 
House. This means for the two-player situation with N = {R, D} that before the 2016 election no singleton was effective for 
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two-third majorities in both chambers of Congress, the Government party is more powerful according to a power index in 
Theorem 4.10. 
4.5. Null players
If we require that a power index of the form ω additionally satisﬁes the Null Player Property, then it must be the 
case that ωA = 0, since the simple game vEA is the only game in the deﬁnition of ω in which a null player in E would 
get a positive amount, namely 1n . This insight results in obvious corollaries of Theorems 4.5–4.10 by adding the Null player 
Property. In the next section the Null Player axiom will play a more prominent role.
5. Inﬁnitely many alternatives
In this section we assume that A is a possibly inﬁnite set, endowed with a topology. More precisely, we assume that A is 
a T1-space, i.e. each set {a} with a ∈ A is closed. The set of all nonempty closed subsets of A is denoted by T . An effectivity 
function for T is deﬁned as before, i.e. as in Deﬁnition 2.1.
The set of monotonic and superadditive effectivity functions E is closed in the following sense.
Lemma 5.1. Let (Ek)k∈N be a sequence in E with E1 ⊆ E2 ⊆ ... Then 
⋃
k∈N Ek ∈ E .
Proof. Let E =⋃k∈N Ek . Then E(S) =⋃k∈N Ek(S) ⊆ T since Ek(S) ⊆ T for all k ∈ N. Further E (∅) = ∅, A ∈ E(S) for all 
S ⊆ N and E (N) = T . Hence, E is an effectivity function for T . (Recall that for E ∈ E and S ∈ P0(N), E(S) is a collection 
of closed sets, and does not need to be closed itself.) Further, if T ⊆ S , B, B ′ ∈ T with B ⊆ B ′ and B ∈ E(T ), then there is 
k ∈ N with B ∈ Ek(T ) and therefore B ′ ∈ Ek(S) by the monotonicity of Ek . Hence, B ∈ E(S), i.e. E is monotonic. Finally, let 
B, B ′ ∈ T and let S, T ⊆ N be nonempty and disjoint such that B ∈ E(T ) and B ′ ∈ E(S). Then there are k, m ∈ N such that 
B ∈ Ek(T ) and B ′ ∈ Em(S). In particular, B ∈ El(T ) and B ′ ∈ El(S) for l = max{k, m}. Hence, B ∩ B ′ ∈ El (S ∪ T ) ⊆ E (S ∪ T ), 
i.e. E is superadditive. 
For an effectivity function E and S ∈ P0(N) let ES be deﬁned by
ES(T ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
T if T = N
E(S) if T ⊇ S and T = N
{A} if T  S and T = ∅
∅ if T = ∅.
Then ES ∈ E for every E ∈ E and S ∈ P0(N). An effectivity function E ∈ E may be decomposed in way that is related to the 
one in Lemma 4.1.
Lemma 5.2. Let E ∈ E and let I ⊆ P0(N) such that S ′ ∈ I whenever there is S ∈ I with S ⊆ S ′ , and let F I =⋃S∈I E S . Then F I ∈ E .
Proof. Clearly, F I is an effectivity function. Let S ⊆ T and let B ∈ F I (S) and B ′ ∈ T with B ⊆ B ′ . Then there is S ′ ∈ I
such that B ∈ ES ′ (S). Hence, B ′ ∈ ES ′(T ) by the monotonicity of ES ′ , and therefore B ′ ∈ F I (T ). For superadditivity, let 
B, B ′ ∈ T \ {A} (if either of these sets equals A, there is nothing to show) and let S, T ⊆ N be nonempty and disjoint such 
that B ∈ F I (S) and B ′ ∈ F I (T ). Then there are S ′, T ′ ∈ I such that B ∈ ES ′(S) ⊆ E(S) and B ′ ∈ ET ′ (T ) ⊆ E(T ). In particular, 
since B, B ′ = A, it must holds that S ′ ⊆ S and T ′ ⊆ T . Hence, B ∩ B ′ ∈ E (S ′ ∪ T ′) ⊆ E (S ∪ T ) by the superadditivity of E . 
Since B ∩ B ′ ∈ ES∪T (S ∪ T ), and since S ∪ T ∈ I , it holds that B ∩ B ′ ∈ F I (S ∪ T ). 
This lemma implies the following one which is quite in the spirit of Lemma 4.2.
Lemma 5.3. Let ϕ and ψ be power indices satisfying the Transfer Property and such that ϕ (ES) = ψ (ES) for all E ∈ E and all S ⊆ N. 
Then ϕ = ψ .
Proof. For any effectivity function E there is a set I E ⊆ P0(N) with S ′ ∈ I E whenever there is S ∈ I E with S ⊆ S ′ , such 
that E = F IE (with F IE deﬁned as in Lemma 5.2). If |I E | = 1, i.e. E = ES for some S , then ϕ (E) = ψ (E) by assumption. Let |I E | ≥ 2 and let the claim be true for all effectivity functions E ′ with |I E ′ | < |I E |. Let S ∈ I E be minimal. Then
ES ∩
⎛⎝ ⋃
T∈I E\{S}
ET
⎞⎠= ⋃
T∈I E\{S}
(ET ∩ ES) =
⋃
T∈I E\{S}
E ′T
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{T : T ∈ I E \ {S}}
satisﬁes the condition of Lemma 5.2, hence ∪T∈I E\{S}E ′T ∈ E . This means that the Transfer Property applies and
ϕ
⎛⎝⋃
T∈I E
ET
⎞⎠= ϕ
⎛⎝ES ∪
⎛⎝ ⋃
T∈I E\{S}
ET
⎞⎠⎞⎠
= ϕ (ES) + ϕ
⎛⎝ ⋃
T∈I E\{S}
ET
⎞⎠− ϕ
⎛⎝ ⋃
T∈I E\{S}
E ′T
⎞⎠
= ψ (ES) + ψ
⎛⎝ ⋃
T∈I E\{S}
ET
⎞⎠− ψ
⎛⎝ ⋃
T∈I E\{S}
E ′T
⎞⎠
= ψ
⎛⎝⋃
T∈I E
ET
⎞⎠ .
by the induction hypothesis. 
We introduce the following regularity condition.
Continuity. For any sequence (Ek)k∈N of effectivity functions with E1 ⊆ E2 ⊆ . . . it holds that
ϕ
( ∞⋃
k=1
Ek
)
= lim
k→∞
ϕ (Ek) .
Note that the left hand side is well deﬁned by Lemma 5.1. In case of a ﬁnite set A, continuity is trivially satisﬁed by any 
power index.
In the following, unless stated otherwise, we assume that probability measures are deﬁned on the σ -ﬁeld P (A), i.e., the 
power set of A. Note, however, that all results in this section are also valid for probability measures deﬁned on the σ -ﬁeld 
of Borel sets – i.e., the σ -ﬁeld generated by the topology on A. For a probability measure μ on P (A) we deﬁne the map 
μ on E by

μ
i (E) =
∫
A
Shi(v
E{a})dμ(a)
for every E ∈ E and i ∈ N . Clearly, ∑i∈N μi (E) = 1 for every E ∈ E(T ), so that μ is a power index.
Theorem 5.4. Let ϕ be a power index. Then ϕ satisﬁes the Transfer Property, Anonymity, Strong Monotonicity, Continuity, and the Null 
Player Property if and only if there is a probability measure μ such that ϕ = μ .
Proof. First, let μ be a probability measure on P (A). We show that μ satisﬁes the ﬁve properties in the theorem. It is 
straightforward that μ satisﬁes Anonymity; and since a null player in E ∈ E obtains 0 in every simple game vE{a} , μ
satisﬁes the Null Player Property. If E, F ∈ E and i ∈ N satisfy the premise of Strong Monotonicity, then Shi(vE{a}) ≤ Shi(v F{a})
for all a ∈ A. Hence, μ satisﬁes Strong Monotonicity.
To see that μ satisﬁes the Transfer Property, let E, F ∈ E with E ∪ F ∈ E(T ). For two simple games v, w we deﬁne the 
simple games v ∨ w and v ∧ w by
(v ∨ w) (S) =max (v(S),w(S)) , and
(v ∧ w) (S) =min (v(S),w(S)) .
It is easy to see that(
vEB ∨ v FB
)
= vE∪FB , and(
vEB ∧ v FB
)
= vE∩FB .
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μ(E ∪ F ) =
∫
A
Shi(v
E∪F{a} )dμ(a) =
∫
A
Shi(v
E{a} ∨ v F{a})dμ(a)
=
∫
A
(
Shi(v
E{a}) + Shi(v F{a}) − Shi(vE{a} ∧ v F{a})
)
dμ(a)
= μ (E) + μ (F ) − ω (E ∩ F ) ,
where the third equality follows from the Transfer Property of the Shapley value (Dubey, 1975).
For Continuity let (Ek)k∈N ⊆ E be an ascending sequence of effectivity functions. Then for any S ⊆ N and any a ∈ A it 
holds that {a} ∈⋃∞k=1 Ek (S) if and only if v⋃∞k=1 Eka (S) = 1, or equivalently limk→∞ vEka (S) = 1. Therefore

μ
i
( ∞⋃
k=1
Ek
)
=
∫
A
Shi
(
v
⋃∞
k=1 Ek
a
)
dμ(a) =
∫
A
Shi
(
lim
k→∞
vEka
)
dμ(a)
=
∫
A
lim
k→∞
Shi
(
vEka
)
dμ(a) = lim
k→∞

μ
i (Ek)
by the Lebesgue Dominated Convergence Theorem as for all a ∈ A the integrand Shi
(
vEka
)
is constant for suﬃciently large k.
Suppose now that ϕ is a power index with the ﬁve properties in the theorem, let S ∈ P0(N), let i ∈ N \ S , and deﬁne a 
function μ on P (A) by
μ(B) = 1− nϕi
(
E0 ∪
(⋃
b∈B
U {b}S
))
(5)
for all B ∈ P (A), where E0 is the effectivity function with E(S) = {A} for all S = ∅, S = N . Note that μ is well deﬁned since 
E0 ∪
(⋃
b∈B U
{b}
S
)
∈ E and since, by Anonymity and Strong Monotonicity, the right hand side does not depend on S ∈ P0(N)
and i ∈ N , provided i /∈ S . We ﬁrst show that μ is a probability measure. Clearly,
μ(∅) = 1− nϕi
(
E0
)
= 1− n1
n
= 0,
where the second equality follows by Anonymity. By Strong Monotonicity, ϕi
(
E0 ∪⋃b∈B U {b}S )≤ ϕi (E0) for all i ∈ N \ S and 
all B ∈ P (A). Hence,
μ(B) ≥ 1− nϕi
(
E0
)
= 0.
Also, μ(A) = 1 − nϕi
(⋃
b∈A U
{b}
S
)
= 1 since i /∈ S is a null player in ⋃b∈A U {b}S . Further, for any two disjoint sets B, C ⊆ A it 
holds that
μ(B ∪ C) = 1− nϕi
( ⋃
b∈B∪C
U {b}S
)
= 1− n
(
ϕi
(⋃
b∈B
U {b}S
)
+ ϕi
(⋃
b∈C
U {b}S
)
− ϕi
(⋃
b∈B
⋃
c∈C
U {b,c}S
))
= 1− nϕi
(⋃
b∈B
U {b}S
)
− nϕi
(⋃
b∈C
U {b}S
)
+ n1
n
= μ(B) + μ(C),
where the second equality follows from the Transfer Property and the third equality follows from Strong Monotonicity 
applied to 
⋃
b∈B
⋃
c∈C U
{b,c}
S and E
0. Hence, μ is ﬁnitely additive. Further, for any sequence (Bk)k∈N with B1 ⊆ B2 ⊆ . . . it 
holds that
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Distribution of Power between the President and Congressmen of the US.
Player Power
President 0.34μ(A1) + 0.48μ(A2) + μ(A3) + 0.2μ(A4)
Senator 10−3 (6.7μ(A1) + 2.9μ(A2) + 4.4μ(A4))
Representative 10−4 (5.4μ(A2) + 8.2μ(A4))
μ
(⋃
k∈N
Bk
)
= 1− nϕi
⎛⎝⋃
k∈N
⎛⎝⋃
b∈Bk
U {b}S
⎞⎠⎞⎠
= 1− n lim
k→∞
ϕi
⎛⎝⋃
b∈Bk
U {b}S
⎞⎠
= lim
k→∞
μ(Bk) .
This shows that μ is continuous from below, which together with ﬁnite additivity implies that μ is σ -additive. Hence, μ is 
a probability measure.
In order to show that ϕ and μ coincide, note that for S ∈ P0(N) and i /∈ S we have
ϕi
(⋃
b∈B
U {b}S
)
= 1
n
(1− μ(B)) = 1
n
μ(A \ B)
=
∫
A\B
Shi
(
v
⋃
b∈B U
{b}
S
a
)
dμ(a) =
∫
A
Shi
(
v
⋃
b∈B U
{b}
S
a
)
dμ(a)
= μi
(⋃
b∈B
U {b}S
)
,
where the third equality follows from the fact that Shi
(
v
⋃
b∈B U
{b}
S
a
)
= 1n for a ∈ A \ B; the fourth equality follows since 
Shi
(
v
∪b∈BU {b}S
a
)
= 0 for a ∈ B as i /∈ S; and the last equality follows by deﬁnition of μ .
Let E ∈ E . For S ∈ P0(N), we have that
ϕ (ES) = ϕ
⎛⎝ ⋃
B∈E(S)
U BS
⎞⎠= ϕ
⎛⎝ ⋃
B∈E(S):|B|=1
U BS
⎞⎠
= μ
⎛⎝ ⋃
B∈E(S):|B|=1
U BS
⎞⎠= μ (ES)
where the second and the last equality follow from Strong Monotonicity. By Lemma 5.3 ϕ and μ coincide. 
Example 5.5 (Example 2.4 continued). When one applies the power index in Theorem 5.4 to the legislative process from the 
introduction (calculations can be found in Appendix C), one obtains the results captured in Table 1. (Strictly speaking the 
sets Ai are ﬁnite, so this is equivalent to using the insight from Subsection 4.5.) Depending on the measures of the sets 
A1, . . . , A4 the overall power of the president lies between 0.2 and 1, a Senator has power between 0.003 and 0.007, and a 
Representative between 0.0005 and 0.0008. As it is the government’s decision what instrument to use in order to achieve 
a certain outcome, the President’s power can be very large. However, since the competencies of the different legislative 
bodies are laid out in the Constitution, the ultimate decision on whether a legislative instrument was appropriate lies with 
the Supreme Court. Hence, a Supreme Court can considerably increase or decrease the President’s power by allowing him 
to make generous use of Executive Orders. 
5.1. An application of the inﬁnite case: a spatial power index
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953b) can be used as a measure of power of the players in a simple game, where this 
simple game represents for instance the political situation in a democratic parliament. In this case the Shapley value is also 
called Shapley–Shubik power index (Shapley and Shubik, 1954). It sets the power of a player equal to the probability that 
this player is pivotal (makes a losing coalition winning) if coalitions are formed in a random order. This way of measuring 
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approach improves on this, as is exempliﬁed by the case of US legislation above.
Political scientists often consider spatial models to remedy this defect (e.g. Enelow and Hinich, 1984, 1990; Grofman et 
al., 1987). A well-known adaptation of the Shapley value to the spatial context is the Owen–Shapley spatial power index 
(Owen and Shapley, 1989; Martin et al., 2014; Peters and Zarzuelo, 2016).
Here, we present a spatial power index, in the spirit of the Owen–Shapley spatial power index, which is a power index 
of an effectivity function as in Theorem 5.4. With some modiﬁcation of our model also the Owen–Shapley spatial power 
index can be obtained as a special case of a power index in this theorem, as we will explain below (Remark 5.7).
As before, N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players. A simple game v (for N) is proper if v(S) = 1 implies that v(N \ S) = 0 for 
each S ∈ P (N). Let k ∈N, k ≥ 2. A spatial game is a pair g = (v, p) where v is a proper simple game and p = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈
(Rk)N with pi = p j whenever i = j, for all i, j ∈ N . Here, pi ∈ Rk is the position of player i. Following Owen and Shapley
(1989) we let the set of issues A be represented by the unit sphere in Rk , i.e.,
A = {a ∈Rk : ‖a‖ = 1} ,
where ‖ · ‖ is the Euclidean distance, and we interpret the inner product pi · a as a measure of the attractiveness of issue 
a ∈ A for a player with position pi . More precisely, we interpret the inequality pi ·a ≤ p j ·a as player i being more in favour
of issue a ∈ A than player j. For a spatial game g = (v, p) and an issue a ∈ A we let Sg(a) ∈ P (N) be a minimal coalition 
such that v(Sg(a)) = 1 and pi ·a ≤ p j ·a for all i ∈ S and j ∈ N \ S . We assume that A is endowed with the relative topology 
induced by the Euclidean topology on Rk . Clearly, Sg(a) is unique for almost all a ∈ A. Thus, Sg(a) is the minimal winning 
coalition such that all players in Sg(a) are more in favour of a than all players not in Sg(a). We call S = Sg(a) minimal 
winning for a. For every coalition S ∈ P0(N) deﬁne Ag(S) = {a ∈ A : S(a) = S}, and deﬁne λg(S) = λ(Ag(S))/λ(A), where 
λ(B) is the Lebesgue measure of a subset B of A. In other words, λg(S) is the fraction of issues for which the coalition S is 
minimal winning. (We assume that measures on A are deﬁned with respect to Borel sets; recall that all our results above 
in Section 5 are valid for the σ -ﬁeld of Borel sets instead of P (A).)
We now deﬁne the spatial power index 
 by

(g) = Sh
⎛⎝ ∑
S∈P0(N)
λg(S)uS
⎞⎠
for every spatial game g , where the simple game uS is the unanimity game for S , i.e., uS(T ) = 1 if and only if S ⊆ T for all 
T ∈ P (N). Clearly, 
i(g) ≥ 0 and ∑ j∈N 
 j(g) = 1 for all g and i ∈ N .
Next, for a spatial game g = (v, p) we deﬁne Eg : P (N) → P (T ) as follows: Eg(∅) = ∅ and for every S ∈ P0(N) and 
B ∈ T , B ∈ Eg(S) if there is T ⊆ S and a ∈ B such that T = Sg(a). Then Eg is monotonic by deﬁnition and superadditive 
since v is proper. Let the probability measure μ on the Borel sets B of A be deﬁned by μ(B) = λ(B)/λ(A), i.e., μ is the 
uniform measure on A. We then have:
Theorem 5.6. For every spatial game g = (v, p),

(g) = μ (Eg)= ∫
A
Shi
(
v
Eg
{a}
)
dμ(a) .
Remark 5.7. The Owen–Shapley spatial power index O is based on a similar construction as above. However, for each issue 
a ∈ A we say that the player i ∈ Sg(a) with p j · a ≤ pi · a for all j ∈ S(a) is pivotal for a ∈ A. Then O assigns to player i the 
fraction of all issues for which this player is pivotal. In other words, all ‘power’ of the coalition S(a) accrues to the ‘last’ 
player to enter the coalition. We can then, similarly, deﬁne an effectivity function based on player i being effective for {a}
whenever i is pivotal for a. Such an effectivity function, however, is no longer superadditive. On the other hand, all our 
main results and in particular Theorem 5.4 also hold without requiring superadditivity: in fact, proofs in general become 
simpler since then the union of effectivity functions is always an effectivity function. Thus, we obtain a result similar to 
Theorem 5.6 for the Owen–Shapley spatial power index, and Theorem 5.4 still applies. 
Appendix A. Lemma A.1
The following lemma is used in the proof of Lemma 4.3.
Lemma A.1. Let B ∈ P (A), let I ⊆N with |I| ≤ 2|A| , and for each j ∈ I let S j ∈ P (N). Let E =⋃ j∈I U BS j . Then E ∈ E and
ϕ(E) =
∑
∅= J⊆I
(−1)| J |+1ϕ
⎛⎝⋂
j∈ J
U BS j
⎞⎠ .
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holds for |I| = 1. Let  ≥ 2 and suppose the statement is true when |I| < . Let I = {1, . . . , }. Then
ϕ(E) = ϕ
(
U BS1
)
+ ϕ
⎛⎝ ⋃
j=2
U BS j
⎞⎠− ϕ
⎛⎝U BS1 ∩
⎛⎝ ⋃
j=2
U BS j
⎞⎠⎞⎠
= ϕ
(
U BS1
)
+
∑
∅= J⊆{2,...,}
(−1)| J |+1ϕ
⎛⎝⋂
j∈ J
U BS j
⎞⎠− ∑
∅= J⊆{2,...,}
(−1)| J |+1ϕ
⎛⎝U BS1 ∩
⎛⎝⋂
j∈ J
U BS j
⎞⎠⎞⎠
=
∑
∅= J⊆I
(−1)| J |+1ϕ
⎛⎝⋂
j∈ J
U BS j
⎞⎠ ,
where the ﬁrst equality follows from the transfer property and Lemma 2.2; the second equality follows by induction; and 
the third equality follows by straightforward rewriting. 
Appendix B. Independence of the axioms
The following lemma shows the independence of the axioms in Theorems 4.5, 4.9, and 4.10.
Lemma B.1. There are power indices ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, ϕ4 such that
1. ϕ1 satisﬁes the Transfer Property, Anonymity, Strong Monotonicity, but not Neutrality;
2. ϕ2 satisﬁes the Transfer Property, Anonymity, Neutrality, but not Monotonicity;
3. ϕ3 satisﬁes the Transfer Property, Strong Monotonicity, Neutrality, but not Anonymity;
4. ϕ4 satisﬁes Anonymity, Strong Monotonicity, Neutrality, but not the Transfer Property.
Proof.
1. Let ϕ1 = ω where ω is a non-negative weight system satisfying ωB = 0 for all B ⊆ A with |B| ≥ 2 and ω{a} = ω{b} for 
some a = b. Then ϕ1 has the desired properties by Theorem 4.10, and ϕ1 is not neutral by Theorem 4.9.
2. Let ϕ2 = ω where the weight system ω satisﬁes ωB = ωB ′ if |B| = ∣∣B ′∣∣, ωB ≤ ωB ′ if B ′ ⊆ B , and ωB < 0 for some 
B ⊆ A. Then ϕ2 has the desired properties but is not monotonic by (the proof of) Theorem 4.5 and by Theorem 4.9.
3. Let α = (αi)i∈N be a vector of strictly positive and distinct real numbers with 
∑
i∈N αi = 1, and let Shα be the weighted 
Shapley value (Shapley, 1953a; Kalai and Samet, 1987). Then ϕ3(E) =∑a∈A 1|A| Shα (vE{a}) satisﬁes the Transfer Property, 
Strong Monotonicity, and Neutrality because of the respective properties of the weighted Shapley value, and it is clear 
that ϕ is not anonymous.
4. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, let Bz denote the normalized Banzhaf–Coleman index (e.g. Owen, 1995), and let ϕ4(E) =∑
a∈A ωaBz
(
vE{a}
)
, where ω is a non-negative weight system such that ωB = 0 for all B ⊆ A with |B| ≥ 2 and ω{a} = 1|A| . 
Then ϕ4 violates the Transfer Property but satisﬁes all the other properties. 
The independence of the Axioms in Theorems 4.5 and 4.10 follows from points 2–4; and the independence of the axioms 
in Theorem 4.9 follows from points 1–4 in Lemma B.1.
The next lemma shows that the axioms in Theorem 5.4 are independent.
Lemma B.2. There are power indices ϕ1, . . . , ϕ5 such that
1. ϕ1 satisﬁes Anonymity, Strong Monotonicity, Continuity, Null Player, but not the Transfer Property;
2. ϕ2 satisﬁes the Transfer Property, Strong Monotonicity, Continuity, Null Player, but not Anonymity;
3. ϕ3 satisﬁes the Transfer Property, Anonymity, Continuity, Null Player, but not Strong Monotonicity;
4. ϕ4 satisﬁes the Transfer Property, Anonymity, Strong Monotonicity, Null Player, but not Continuity;
5. ϕ5 satisﬁes the Transfer Property, Anonymity, Strong Monotonicity, Continuity, but not Null Player.
Proof.
1. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and let ϕ1(E) = ∫A Bz(vE{a})dμ(a) for every E ∈ E , where Bz is the Banzhaf–Coleman index as in 
Lemma B.1, and μ is a probability measure on P (A).
2. Let ϕ2(E) = ∫A Shα(vE{a})dμ(a) for every E ∈ E , where Shα is a weighted Shapley value with all weights distinct as in 
Lemma B.1, and μ is a probability measure on P (A).
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for every E ∈ E .
4. Let ϕ4(E) = ∫A Sh(vE{a})dμ(a) for every E ∈ E , where A = [0, ∞) and μ(B) = limk→∞ 1k · λ(B ∩ (0, k)) for every Borel set 
B of A, where λ is the Lebesgue measure. Observe that μ is ﬁnitely additive but not σ -additive, but the integral is still 
well-deﬁned since the integrand takes only ﬁnitely many values. Now ϕ4 satisﬁes all axioms except CO by the proof of 
Theorem 5.4.
5. Let ϕ5i (E) = 1n for every i ∈ N . 
Appendix C. Example 5.5
Clearly, Shp(vE{a}) = 1 for all a ∈ A3. For a ∈ A1 we have that all h ∈ H are null players and hence
Shs
(
vE{a}
)
= 33!67!
101!
(
99
66
)
≈ 6.634× 10−3,
Shp
(
vE{a}
)
≈ 0.3366.
For a ∈ A2 we have
Shs
(
vE{a}
)
=
(
99
50
) 435∑
k=218
(52+ k)−1
(
536
52+ k
)−1(435
k
)
≈ 2.884× 10−3,
Shh
(
vE{a}
)
=
(
434
217
) 100∑
k=51
(219+ k)−1
(
536
219+ k
)−1(100
k
)
≈ 5.429× 10−4,
Shp
(
vE{a}
)
≈ 0.4754.
For a ∈ A4 we have
Shs
(
vE{a}
)
=
(
99
50
) 435∑
k=218
(52+ k)−1
(
536
52+ k
)−1(435
k
)
+
(
99
66
) 435∑
k=290
(67+ k)−1
(
536
67+ k
)−1(435
k
)
≈ 4.374× 10−3
Shp
(
vE{a}
)
=
(
434
217
) 100∑
k=51
(219+ k)−1
(
536
219+ k
)−1(100
k
)
+
(
435
289
) 100∑
k=67
(290+ k)−1
(
536
290+ k
)−1(100
k
)
≈ 8.244× 10−4
Shp
(
vE{a}
)
≈ 0.204.
For the overall legislative process we therefore ﬁnd
ϕs(E) = 1
1000
(6.634μ(A1) + 2.884μ(A2) + 4.374μ(A4))
ϕh(E) = 110000 (5.429μ(A2) + 8.244μ(A4))
ϕp(E) = 1
10
(3.366μ(A1) + 4.754μ(A2) + 10μ(A3) + 2.04μ(A4)) .
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